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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
1'laintilt,'Appellee, • ':" • : • 
v. : 
CRAIG NORMAN HENDRICKS, : 
Case No, 20001006-1A 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priorit\ K- ? 
JUM iSDICliOl I ' lLSlATEMENT 
-,-:,/ TITH on (his Court pursuant to Utah Code Aim. § 78-2a-3(2}' ) 
•
Ki
" * prellaiii/Dciciidant Craig Hendricks was convicted of Domestic Violence 
iiuiici}, a class M misdemeanor, in violation of SalfT ;^ • iu * wGv . / 
STATEMENT CM-" ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
t \ W'liether the trial court erred in submitting a defense of liabitatiori instruction to the 
jury which was not supported by the evidence. 
Standard of Review: "Determining the piopneh ml *i inn) msliuui m presents a 
n
" ^ i vuil noiiMleleiviilialh for correctness. State v. Brooks. 
8 - I); see also State v. Carlson, 934 P.2d 657, 659 (I Jtah -%, 
1997). 
B. Whether the trial court erred in submitting a defense of habitation instruction to the 
jury which impermissibly shifted the burdens of proof and persuasion to the 
defendant. 
Standard of Review: "Determining the propriety of a jury instruction presents a 
question of law" which is reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. State v. Brooks. 
833 P.2d 363, 363 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Carlson. 934 P.2d 657, 659 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Craig Hendricks' objection to Salt Lake City's proposed jury instruction regarding 
defense of habitation is preserved in the Record of Appeal at 76:46-48, 144. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-405 (1999); 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-36-12 (1999); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); 
Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020-DV (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Craig Hendricks was charged with Domestic Violence Battery and Domestic 
Violence Disturbing the Peace stemming from an incident on September 9, 2000, wherein 
Mr. Hendricks was alleged to have used unlawful force or violence upon his brother, 
Lowell Hendricks, and by engaging in fighting behavior. (R. 1-4.) At arraignment, the 
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Honorable Judge Anthony B. Quinn appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
(LDA) to represent Mr. Hendricks. (R. 7.) At the pretrial conference, the matter was set 
for jury trial on October 11,2000. (R. 13.) On October 11,2000, upon Salt Lake City's 
request, the jury trial was continued to October 25, 2000. (R. 18.) The case proceeded to 
jury trial where Mr. Hendricks was convicted of Domestic Violence Battery, and 
acquitted of the charge of Domestic Violence Disturbing the Peace. (R. 60.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the late evening of September 9, 2000, Craig Hendricks ("Craig") was 
visiting his brother, Lowell Hendricks ("Lowell") at Lowell's residence located at 953 
South Denver Street. (R. 76:9-10, 88-90.) Craig had lived with Lowell for several years 
and had recently been asked to move. (R. 76:7-8, 67.) All of Craig's belongings were 
stored at the Denver Street residence, and his mail was delivered to that address . (R. 
76:10, 67-68.) Furthermore, Craig spent the night of September 8,2000, at the Denver 
Street home. (R. 76:12,23, 67, 68.) According to testimony elicited at trial, in the early 
evening of September 9, 2000, Lowell observed Craig in the backyard of the Denver 
Street house working on his truck. (R. 76:9.) Lowell did not ask Craig to leave. (R. 
76:9.) 
Lowell testified at jury trial that he found Craig inside his house late on September 
9, 2000, without his permission. (R. 76:14.) Lowell then told Craig to leave. (R. 76:14.) 
Lowell further testified that he never used force or a threat of force to make Craig leave. 
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(R. 76:18-19.) Lowell admitted that he had been drinking alcohol throughout the day of 
September 9, 2000. (R. 76:20-21.) Lowell insisted that without warning, Craig attacked 
him violently causing a "black eye" and bruising on his arms and legs. (R. 76:14, 16-18.) 
Lowell maintained that he did not strike Craig in any way. (R. 76:18-20, 68.) 
Craig testified at jury trial that he had stayed the night of September 8, 2000, with 
his brother Lowell, and on September 9,2000, Lowell told him he could sleep at the 
house again. (R. 76:102.) Craig testified that Lowell was intoxicated and began 
touching Craig in an unwanted, teasing manner. (R. 76:90-91.) Craig asked Lowell to 
stop. (R. 76:91.) Craig testified that Lowell had become violent in the past, when 
Lowell was drunk. (R. 76:90, 93-94.) Craig was afraid that Lowell was going to 
become violent yet again that night. (R. 76:93.) At one point in the evening, Lowell 
grabbed Craig with unlawful force. (R. 76:93-94.) Craig felt that his only option was to 
protect himself; he then punched Lowell in self-defense. (R. 76:93-94.) The two 
brothers scuffled for several minutes until Lowell left. (R. 76:93-6.) The police were 
called and Craig was subsequently arrested and charged with Domestic Violence Battery 
and Domestic Violence Disturbing the Peace. (R. 76:74.) 
At jury trial, Salt Lake City Prosecutor Don M. Wrye submitted a proposed 
defense of habitation jury instruction to the trial court. (R.76:43.) Defense counsel 
objected to the instruction stating that there was no evidence to support the jury 
instruction. (R. 76:46-48.) Moreover, defense counsel stated that the instruction would 
4 
confuse the jury and impermissibly negate Craig's self-defense by allowing the jury to 
justify Lowell's actions and thereby find that Craig was the initial aggressor. (R. 76:46-
48, 144.) Counsel for Salt Lake City argued that the defense of habitation instruction 
was warranted because Lowell's conduct was justified and to counter the self-defense 
claim by the defendant. (R. 76:46.) Judge Boy den then submitted Salt Lake City's 
proposed defense of habitation instruction to the jury. (R. 41.) 
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Lowell was allowed to use 
force against Craig because "[ajnything that... Lowell might have done then to try to 
stop him [Craig] from coming into his house is justified." (R. 76:136.) The prosecutor 
also relied on the presumption that Lowell acted reasonably thereby negating Craig's 
self-defense claim as a matter of law. (R. 76:136-37.) The jury returned a verdict of 
guilty to Domestic Violence Battery while acquitting Craig of the Domestic Violence 
Disturbing the Peace charge. (R. 60.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Craig's right to a fair trial was jeopardized when the trial court submitted a defense 
of habitation to the jury, thereby allowing justification of the victim's conduct. Because 
the instruction was not supported by the evidence and unconstitutionally shifted both the 
burden of proof and persuasion upon the defendant in a criminal case, Craig's conviction 
should be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE JURY WITH THE 
DEFENSE OF HABITATION INSTRUCTION WHEN THE 
INSTRUCTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
The trial court erred in its conclusion that the prosecution was entitled to present a 
defense of habitation instruction to the jury, absent evidence to support such an 
instruction. All instructions given to a jury by the trial court must be supported by the 
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264 (Utah 1988); State v. 
McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). There must exist a relationship between the 
given jury instruction and the evidence presented at trial. IdL 
Here, the record does not support the trial court's decision to instruct the jury as to 
defense of habitation. The defense of habitation instruction submitted at trial is a 
paraphrase of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405, which provides a statutory defense to criminal 
and civil charges. (R. 41.)(Attached hereto as Addendum B.); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-405. In State ex rel. R.J.Z.. the Utah Supreme Court outlined two criteria a defendant 
must meet in order to justify the presentation of the defense of habitation defense. 736 
P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 1987)(entry must be unlawful and forceful). First, a defendant must 
demonstrate the unlawfulness of an alleged entry, and second, a defendant must 
demonstrate the entry was forcible. Id. at 236. At bar, the prosecution failed to 
demonstrate sufficient evidence that Craig committed an unlawful and forcible entry into 
the house rented by Lowell. Without such a showing, the proposed instruction was 
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improper and should have never been tendered to the jury. 
A. Lowell did not have a legal right to exclude Craig by force 
from the Denver Street residence and thus Craig's entry was 
not unlawful. 
According to Lowell, Craig lived with him for several years. (R. 76:7-8, 67.) All 
of Craig's belongings were stored at the Denver Street house and Craig received his mail 
at the Denver Street house. (R. 76:10, 67-68.) Moreover, Craig spent the night at the 
Denver Street home, as recently as the night before the altercation at issue. (R. 76:12,23, 
67-68.) On September 9,2000, Craig even worked on his truck in the backyard of the 
Denver Street house and was never asked to leave the premises. (R. 76:9.) Given 
Lowell's clear acquiescence, the prosecution failed to prove that Lowell had a legal right 
to eject Craig from the Denver Street residence. 
Utah law does not allow a landlord to use force to evict tenants. See. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-12 (exclusion of tenant without the judicial process prohibited). Under 
Utah law, even one with a legal right to dispose of and occupy property is not entitled to 
use self-help to accomplish that end. Id. Similarly, even assuming, arguendo, that 
Lowell may have had a legal right to exclude Craig from the Denver Street residence 
through the judicial process, he had no right to use force to accomplish that goal. 
Other jurisdictions have held that a party may not avail themselves of a defense of 
habitation claim when a confrontation arises between cohabitants. In Cooper v. U.S.. 
cohabitating brothers quarreled, leading to one brother's death. 512 A.2d 1002 (D.C. 
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1986). On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury that the defendant had a right to defend his home. Instead, the trial judge 
instructed the jury on self-defense. The appellate court affirmed the conviction holding 
that the defense of habitation defense was inapplicable when both parties have a right to 
occupy the house. See also. State v. Bobbit 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), on remand on 
other grounds to. 420 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1982), petition for review 
denied, 429 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1983)(defense of habitation claim is inapplicable unless the 
assailant is an intruder). 
Here, the need to defend one's home from an intruder is distinguishable from the 
need to defend it from a cohabitating sibling. Because both Craig and Lowell were on 
common ground, neither had the legal right to eject the other through force. 
B. Craig's entry into the Denver Street residence was not forcible. 
Absolutely no evidence was presented at trial to support the claim that Craig's 
entry into the Denver Street house was forcible. At trial, Lowell testified that Craig 
entered the house through the unlocked kitchen door. (R. 76:11, 14.) In conflict, Craig 
testified that he entered the house through the front door after Lowell let him in, wherein 
they had a peaceful conversation prior to the altercation. (R. 76:89-90.) Accepting either 
version as true, neither supports a conclusion that Craig's entry into the home was 
forcible. Accordingly, the defense of habitation was inapplicable to justify Lowell's 
conduct because the prosecution failed to prove that Craig's entry was forcible. 
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C. The defense of habitation instruction is inapplicable to justify 
Lowell's conduct insofar as he is not the defendant. 
The prosecution presented the defense of habitation instruction to justify Lowell's 
conduct despite the fact that Lowell was not charged with a crime related to this incident. 
(R. 76:46.) The defense of habitation instruction did not apply to justify Lowell's 
conduct insofar as he was not charged with a criminal offense arising out of this incident 
and the defense is a statutory defense to criminal charges. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
405. Had Lowell been the defendant in this case, he would have had the burden of 
presenting some evidence in support of his defense of habitation. 
There is no evidence that Craig used force to enter Lowell's house. Moreover, the 
record is silent as to whether Lowell reasonably believed force was necessary to prevent 
or terminate Craig's entry into the home, as required by law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
405. Surprisingly, the prosecution's own witness, Lowell, maintained that he never used 
any force whatsoever against Craig. (R. 76:14, 18-20, 68.) This testimony contradicted 
the prosecution's theory that Lowell used force to defend his residence. Because Lowell 
maintained that he did not use any force against Craig, the prosecution cannot then claim 
that any force used by Lowell was justified in defense of his habitation. Because Lowell 
would not be entitled to a defense of habitation instruction had he been the defendant, the 
prosecution cannot rely on the defense to justify its victim's actions and thereby negate 
Craig's self-defense claim. 
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n THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION INSTRUCTION IMPERMISSIBLY 
SHIFTED THE BURDENS OF PROOF AND PERSUASION UPON THE 
DEFENDANT AND DIMINISHED THE PROSECUTION'S BURDEN OF 
PROOF 
The inclusion of the defense of habitation instruction was misleading, confusing, 
and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of both proof and persuasion upon the 
defendant. Defense counsel objected to the inclusion of the instruction arguing that it 
would confuse the jury and impermissibly negate Craig's self-defense claim.1 (R. 76:46-
48, 144.) The trial judge disagreed and submitted the jury instruction. (R. 41, R. 76:48.) 
The defense of habitation instruction stated: 
You are further instructed that a person is justified 
in using force against another in defense of one's habitation 
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that 
force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful 
entry into or attack upon that habitation. 
Furthermore, the person using force in defense of habitation 
is presumed to have acted reasonably and to have had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the 
entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted 
by use of force or in a violent or tumultuous manner. 
The reasonableness of a belief that a person is justified 
in using force in the defense of habitation is an objective standard 
and must be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person 
acting under the then existing circumstances. Further, the force 
1
 Assuming, arguendo, that defense counsel did not preserve the record by stating the 
defense of habitation instruction would shift the burdens of proof and persuasion to the 
defendant, appellant asserts that the inclusion of the instruction was a manifest injustice. Ut. R. 
Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995). Because the instruction had a 
presumption that the defendant needed to rebut, the inclusion of the instruction impermissibly 
required the defendant to bear the burdens of proof and persuasion against long-standing 
precedent to the contrary, and affected the defendant's substantial right to a fair trial. 
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used must be proportional. That is, only to the extent necessary 
to prevent or terminate what the person using the force 
reasonably believes is an unlawful entry into or attack upon, or 
attempted unlawful entry into or attack upon, his or her 
habitation. 
(R. 41.); see Addendum B. 
Lacking from the defense of habitation instruction was an explanation that the 
instruction did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof. The instruction also 
lacked a definition of what constitutes an unlawful entry. Finally, the instruction failed to 
inform the jury that the presumption of reasonableness could be rebutted, or that Craig 
was required only to present "some" evidence to rebut the presumption. In essence, the 
instruction informed the jury that as a matter of law, a person could use force to remove a 
person from a residence, despite law to the contrary. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12 
(exclusion of tenants without the judicial process prohibited); Keller v. Southwood North 
Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998); Wadev.Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991). 
At bar, the defense of habitation instruction was prejudicial because it dictated that 
the "person using force in defense of habitation is presumed to have acted reasonably..." 
(R. 41.); see Addendum B. In effect, the instruction created a mandatory rebuttable 
presumption that relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove that Craig did not act in 
self-defense. 
[I]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary] device's 
constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device 
must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on 
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evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen. 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). Here, the jury 
instruction at issue relieved the jurors of finding that Craig did not act in self-defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A mandatory rebuttable presumption in a jury instruction charged against the 
defendant is unconstitutional. See, e.g.. Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307 (1985); State v. 
Chambers. 709 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1985). The due process clause requires the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every fact necessary to 
constitute a crime. See. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Because of constitutional 
protections, the prosecution is not entitled to rely on a mandatory rebuttable presumption 
that relieves it of its burden of proof and persuasion. Chambers. 709 P.2d at 326. 
As laid out in State v. Moritzsky. the defense of habitation defense, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405, vests in a person who is entitled to assert the defense, the 
claim that his actions were reasonable. 771 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah App. 1989). Once a 
person is entitled to the presumption of reasonableness, the prosecution is required to 
rebut the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt to negate the defense. Id at 691; see 
also In re R.J.Z.. 736 P.2d at 236. 
Using this framework, the presumption of reasonableness was vested in Lowell's 
conduct thereby requiring Craig to rebut the presumption and persuade the jury that 
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Lowell's actions were not reasonable. In effect, the defense was not only required to 
rebut the presumption, but had the burden of both proof and persuasion as to the Craig's 
self-defense claim, which is contrary to long-standing precedent. See, State v. Torres, 
619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (defendant relying on self-defense is entitled to have the 
jury instructed that the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that 
the defendant has no burden); State v. Knoll. 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985)(the 
requirement that State bear burden of proof in self-defense cases derives from the 
constitutional requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Numerous cases have held that a defendant bears no burden of persuasion in presenting 
an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Torres, 619 P.2d at 695. The admission of the defense 
of habitation instruction thereby violated the defendant's due process rights because not 
only did he have to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Lowell was not 
defending the Denver Street house, but he also had to persuade the jury that Lowell was 
not defending the Denver Street house, that Craig's entry wasn't unlawful, and that Craig 
was acting in self-defense. 
Requiring Craig to prove that he was acting in self-defense flies in the face of 
established principles of both federal and state law. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510, 527 (1979)(ffthe Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees prohibit a state from 
shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving an element of the crime charged"). 
Establishing an affirmative defense is a very limited burden. See State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 
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775, 779 (Utah App. 1990). The defendant only f,assume[s] the burden of producing 
some evidence [of the affirmative defense] if there is no evidence in the prosecution's 
case that would provide some kind of evidentiary foundation for [an affirmative defense 
claim].11 Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215. Utah has unambiguously adopted the position that "a 
defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion in presenting an affirmative defense." 
State v. Starks. 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981). "The prosecutors burden ... is to prove all 
elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the defense is a denial 
or an affirmative defense." IdL The inherent unfairness of requiring Craig to prove that 
he was acting in self-defense impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and persuasion 
and required him to prove his innocence and deprived him of a fair trial. 
In arguing against Craig's self-defense claim, the prosecution relied on the defense 
of habitation instruction to justify Lowell's attack on Craig. (R. 76:136-37.) The 
prosecutor stated: "[a]nything that... Lowell might have done then to try to stop him 
[Craig] from coming into his house is justified." (R. 76:136.) The prosecutor furthered 
the problem when he stated that Lowell was presumed to have acted reasonably. 
(R.76:136.) In effect, the jury instruction, combined with the prosecutor's argument, 
informed the jurors that even if they believed the defendant's account of the incident, they 
must find Craig guilty of battery because Lowell was, as a matter of law, allowed to use 
unlawful force against Craig and Craig thereby did not have a self-defense claim. The 
inclusion of the jury instruction thus compromised Craig's right to present his defense, 
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leaving the jury to presume that Craig was legally unable to raise a claim of self-defense. 
Craig's position that the jury instruction confused the jury is supported by the 
inconsistent verdict. The jury returned a guilty verdict as to battery, but a not guilty 
verdict as to disturbing the peace. (R. 60.) Ironically, the jury determined that Craig had 
not engaged in fighting behavior, but yet used unlawful force or violence against Lowell. 
A reasonable inference is drawn that the jury may not have clearly understood the given 
instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the defense of habitation instruction was not supported by the evidence, 
and was misused by the prosecution to negate the defendant's self-defense claim, it 
violated his right to a fair trial. For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Hendricks respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this ytt day of June, 2001. 
^ A £ 
Rud\J. Biutista 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, Rudy J. Bautista, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 
140320, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to Don M. Wrye, 349 South 
200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this H*L day of June, 2001. 
Rudy v. Bautista 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's 
Office as indicated above this day of June, 2001. 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT FORM 
Domestic Violence Court 
STATE Plaintiff 
-vs-
MsX^ir\c^/ C^fA^n H 1 Defendant 
reter 
MftH^fey 'dxilW 
nor child present finding 
20URT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
idant: to Commence Serving Jail Sentence 
ne Amt. $ Susp. $ 
Case Number 00 I ^ / S (ffl^f 
Tape Number. 2mo- ftp c#. 
Date Time 
Judge J&LgL^S 





Fee$ Fine Bal $ 
a^ 
lent Schedule: Pay$ 
xirt Costs $ 
per month/1 st Pmt. Due 
nunity Service/WP 
3Stitution $ 
ttorney Fees $ 
obation / f f l T p t 1 G°od Behavior 
s of Probation: 
sio Further Violations 
J^o Unlawful Contact/No Contact With Victim 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Last Pmt. Due 
by. 
Pay to: [ ] Court [ ] Victim [ ] Show Proof to Court by 
[ ] AP&P [ ] ACEC [ ] Other 
[X] Counseling thru. Must report within 48 Hrs. 
[X] Classes as determined by assessment 
^o Possession, purchaser, or use of dangerous weapon [ ] Parenting classes 
sJo Alcohol 
Drotective order signed in court. 
Employment [ ] Obtain [ ] Maintain 
[ ] Victim Class 
[X] Appear for Reviews 
[ 1 
[ ] 
Dlea n Abeyance. 
vJext Court Appearance: 
mpliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
ng special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
and services) during this proceeding should call third District 
: at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
EAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT 
PROVIDE PROOF OF I 
By 
STAMfWSED AT *»? 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are further instructed that a person is justified in using force 
against another in defense one's habitation when and to the extent that 
he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon that 
habitation. 
Furthermore, the person using force in defense of habitation is 
presumed to have acted reasonably and to have had a reasonable fear 
of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or 
attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of force or 
in a violent or tumultuous manner. 
The reasonableness of a belief that a person is justified in using 
force in the defense of habitation is an objective standard and must be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person acting under the 
then existing circumstances. Further, the force used must be 
proportional. That is, only to the extent necessary to prevent or 
terminate what the person using the force reasonably believes is an 
unlawful entry into or attack upon, or attempted unlawful entry into or 
attack upon, his or her habitation. 
